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Abstract In the existing economy based models of grid re-
source allocation and management, just as commodity mar-
ket model and posted price model, sharing resource is based
on negotiating about the usage duration or time, the usage
fee, QoS (Quality of Service) and some other items between
the owner or his broker and the consumer of grid resource.
That will cost so much time for a great deal of grid users
This paper organically combines and extends three ourselves
conference papers which appear in [25, 26], and [27], respectively.
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no matter whether they are grid resource owners or grid re-
source consumers, which reduced the sharing efficiency in
the grid environment and some time is even unacceptable.
In this paper, for solving the problem as described above,
we present a scheme which is combined by 3 aspects: one is
GRS (Grid Resource Supermarket), the second one is posted
price model based on GRS, the third one is optimization
based on MOGAP (Multi-Objects Generalized Assignment
Problem). In the end, three examples are given to show the
feasibility of our scheme.
Keywords Grid resource allocation · Sharing efficiency ·
GRS · MOGAP · Optimization
1 Introduction
Grid resource allocation and management is very compli-
cated and difficult problem because the resources are dis-
tributed, heterogeneous in nature, owned by different in-
dividuals or organizations each having their own resource
management policies and different access-and-cost models.
Thus, some resource allocation and management models
based on market, or economic models in the grid have been
proposed such as commodity market, posted price, tenders
and auctions, negotiation price model, contract agreement,
model of auctioning, employing exchange model of bid [1–
3]. Generally, based on these models, resource consumers
make use of GRBs (Grid Resource Broker) to submit ap-
plications of the resource consumption. GRBs meet the re-
quirements of these resource consumers via grid middleware
services. It is obvious that the process of the sharing will cost
much time at negotiating about the usage duration or time,
the usage fee, QoS and some other items about sharing ac-
cess. On the other hand, it is also clear that these models are
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only beneficial to the grid consumer, who can finish their
work at the lower cost.
In this paper, we try to solve the efficiency bottleneck
of grid resource sharing, which is combined by 3 aspects:
one is GRS, the second one is posted price model based on
GRS, the third one is optimization based on MOGAP. We
also try to be on behalf of GRM (Grid Resource Manager)
and propose the idea of GRS to meet the service of grid
resource sharing. Supermarket is welcomed by people and
fits the habit of people’s consumption. Constructing GRS by
GRS user agent and GRS resource agent, serving grid con-
sumer via GRS user agent, organizing the grid resource from
their owner and negotiating about the time, the price and
the QoS of resource sharing, we get a new idea of GRAM
(Grid resource allocation and management) based on eco-
nomic model. One important thing is that all the negotiating
interaction between the resource provider and the GRS re-
source agent is finished in background instead of foreground
before the resource sharing. After construction of GRS, the
grid resources consumer shares the resource just as in the
posted price model. Of course, the GRS is always chang-
ing because grid is dynamic. Furthermore, GRS managers
can profit from price difference between the cost and sale
price of the GRS resource. Generalized Assignment Prob-
lem (GAP) is used to allot the resource in GRS to optimize
the allocation of resource.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the related
work are presented. Section 3 introduces the posted price
model. Section 4 presents the idea of GRS and its construc-
tion. In Sect. 5, the GRS-based posted price model is de-
fined. Section 6 discusses the optimization of allocation of
resource. There are some examples in Sect. 7. Finally, con-
clusions and future work are outlined in the last Sect. 8.
2 Related works
Our work is based on GRS built in virtual organization
(VO). Foster clarifies the concept about VO in [4]. VO is
a set of individuals and institutions defined by uniform shar-
ing rules.
Classifying based on the economic model, our work falls
into the category of posted price model. Posted price model
is similarly to the commodity market [5], except that spe-
cial offers are advertised for notifying consumers discounted
prices [6, 7]. One recent work about the commodity market
is presented by Gunther Stuer etc., where in order to find
price equilibria in commodity market, some refinements of
Smale’s method application are proposed [8]. Some other
related economic models are bargaining, tendering/contract-
net, auction, bid-based, bartering, monopoly and oligopoly,
and other various forms.
In bargaining, providers and consumers negotiate each
other. Providers commonly want to get higher prices but
consumers want to get lower prices. This negotiation con-
tinues until both providers and consumers all agree a same
price which is acceptable to them. When the price is dif-
ficult to define, bargaining is a well economic model to
achieve a acceptable price [9]. Tendering /contract-net al-
lows a customer announces requirements to potential pro-
ducers for looking for the desirable provider [10]. Auction
allows consumers to submit bids through an auctioneer un-
til a single clearing price appears, this price is higher than
the price other customers can accept [11]. A typical bid-
based is the resources assigned are in direct proportion to
the bids of the consumers [12]. Bartering supports sharing
each others’ resources between providers and consumers, if
consumers are also providers and thus both contribute and
use resources [13]. Monopoly/oligopoly is non-competitive.
There are only a single or a number of providers determines
the price [14].
In the commodity market model, resource providers
specify their service price and charge users according the
amount of resource they consume. A provider uses a broker-
ing system where each request is distributed until the accu-
mulated brokerage cost is limited by the budget of the user
[5]. The pricing policy can be derived from various param-
eters and can be flat or variable depending on the resource
supply and demand. In general, services are priced in such
a way that supply and demand equilibrium is maintained.
Logic structure of commodity model is just shown in Fig. 1.
Some in-depth works on posted price model are pre-
sented in [15–17]. Anastasiadi etc. present three routing al-
gorithms which are related with expected completion time
and required network bandwidth [28]. Based on it, they in-
vestigate the load balancing economy occasions in which
providers can advertise prices and transaction requests at a
bulletin board [15]. Ferguson etc. investigate the load bal-
ancing economy occasions in which First-price and Dutch
auctions enable each provider to host its independent auc-
tion, and enable users to decide which auction they should
participate according to last prices advertised in bulletin
boards [16]. In [17], when advertising resource request and
prices on a bulletin board, currency flow is used to restrict
resource usage in order to control potential intrusion attacks
and minimize the damages.
3 Posted price model
Posted price model is related on the commodity market
model [1–3]. Two key players driving the grid marketplace
are GSPs (Grid Service Providers) and GRBs (Grid Re-
source Brokers). The posted price model is similar to the
commodity market model except that it advertises special
offers in order to attract (new) consumers to establish mar-
ket share or motivate users to consider using cheaper slots.
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Fig. 1 Interaction between GSPs and users in a commodity market
Grid for resource trading
Logic structure of posted price model is given in Fig. 2. In
this case, brokers need not negotiate directly with GSPs for
flat fee, usage duration or time, QoS etc., but use posted
prices as they are generally cheaper compared to regular
prices. The posted-price offers will have usage conditions,
but they might be attractive for some users.
In Figs. 1, 2, consumers interact with their own bro-
kers for managing and scheduling their computations on the
grid. The GSPs make their resource grid enabled by run-
ning software systems along with GTS (Grid Trading Ser-
vices), which enables resource trading and execution of con-
sumer requests directly through GRBs. The interaction be-
tween GRBs and GSPs during resource trading is mediated
through a GMD (Grid Market Directory). They use vari-
ous economy models or interaction protocol for deciding
service access price. As there are much grid resource user
and a great deal of resources in grid environment even in a
VO (Virtual Organization), time and efficiency will be their
problems.
Some researchers have focused on the job scheduling
part of a grid management infrastructure [18]. They either
proposed a framework for price-based resource allocation
and resources pricing algorithm to achieve maximized uti-
lization of grid resources [19], or formalized the resource
allocation problem for Service Level Agreement (SLA)-
constrained grid applications [20].
4 Constructing GRS based on multi-agents
The GRS is a virtual, logic entity. It consists of information
of a great deal of GSPs (Grid Service providers) and grid re-
sources including traditional resources: computer, network,
storage system, and highly generic sense resources that
means any capability that may be shared and exploited in
a networked environment: database, data transfer, simula-
tion [21]. Obviously, the principle of constructing GRS is to
Fig. 2 Posted price model and resource trading in a computational
market environment
serve the grid users whether they are grid resource providers
or consumers, and make the managers of GRS get more
profits. In other words, GRS gets the permission of grid re-
source from the providers or owners of resource in lower
price and sell it at higher price to the grid consumers. GRS
resource agent and GRS user agent play an important role
in GRS management. The model of constructing GRS is as
Fig. 3. GRS resource agents take charge of collecting the
information of grid resource that can be shared by any oth-
ers, negotiating about the price and the other items with the
resource provider. GRS user agents take charge of respond-
ing the grid consumers and leading to the consumers sharing
the resources in two modes that we will introduce at the next
paragraph.
The grid consumer GRS is built in a VO (Virtual Orga-
nization) [22]. Of course, there maybe server GRS in some
VO. GRS is a dynamic virtual entity while the resource in it
can login or logout dynamic.
For ease of understanding, let’s firstly introduce the con-
cept about VO (Virtual Organization). In grid environment,
sharing resource coordinately and solving problems in VO
mode are two key functions which should be provided. VO
is a set of individuals and institutions defined by uniform
sharing rules. This sharing is, necessarily, highly controlled,
with resource providers and consumers defining clearly and
carefully just what is shared, who is allowed to share, and
the conditions under which sharing occurs [4]. Most solv-
ing and brokering strategies in grid environment are closely
related with this sharing.
The profits of GRS is depended on the policy of the re-
sources that how much to buy in and how much to sell
out. Therefore, the resource value in GRS needs to be de-
fined as a function of many parameters as follows: Resource
Value = Function (Resource strength, Cost of physical re-
sources, Service overhead, Demand, Value perceived by the
user, Preferences). It is also obviously that the resource
value can vary after a period of time.
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Fig. 3 Logic Structure of GRS
(Grid Resource Supermarket)
The pricing strategy of GRS is a key problem for their
manager. It includes two parts in this paper. One is posted
price based GRS model. The other is grid resource optimiza-
tion based Assignment Problem (AP).
5 Posted price model based on GRS
In the posted price model based on GRS, price is negoti-
ated back the stage by GRS resource agent and grid resource
provider. Of course, it is different from the model of posted
price which the price is negotiated on the stage.
This is a simplified resource mode based on economy.
In this model, grid resource consumers share the GRS re-
source at posted price. It would not spend time to negotiating
about the time, the price, the QoS etc. each other. The man-
ager of GRS gains the profits by serving the grid resource
provider and grid resource consumer. The grid resource con-
sumers share the resource at posted price according to their
plans and pocketbooks. The grid resource provider gains his
income for his resource being shared. The description of
this mode is as follows. We might as well suppose that our
GRS has n pieces of resources, each resource has his ID,
resource name, bank account of owner, access time for shar-
ing, resource amount, price etc., which can be formalized
as GRS−Ri = (Ri-ID,Ri-name,Ri-account, time,amount,
Ri-price-in, . . . ,Ri-IP) i = 1,2, . . . , n. We also might as well
suppose that GRS-Ri is shared by some grid consumers. The
homologous item’s formula is Sell-Ri = (Ri-ID,Ri-name,
Ri-account, time,amount,Ri-price-out, . . . ,Ri-IP) i = 1,2,
. . . , n. Therefore, the manager of GRS gains the profits ac-







In general, Ri-price-in is bigger than Ri-price-out , thus the
manager of GRS can get profits.
There are obvious differences between conventional
posted price model and GRS-based posted price model. The
main difference is that, all the details about resource shar-
ing such as cost fee, usage duration or time, QoS and other
items in our approach are negotiated about while the GRS is
constructed. That means a foreground task is changed into
background task, and an instant task is changed into prepara-
tory one. Time for negotiating is not necessary any more. It
is just the advantage of our approach.
6 Optimization based on GAP
The scheme includes two parts. One is the posted price
model based on GRS. The other is grid resource optimiza-
tion based on GAP (Generalized Assignment Problem) in
order to maximize the profits for the GRS manager, which
will be presented in this section.
The GRS-based posted price model is fit to the sporadic
grid consumers. For the group consumers, a optimized ap-
proach is proposed as follows.
Generally, assignment problem can be defined as: There
are n persons and n pieces of jobs. Any person can be as-
signed to perform any job, incurring profits that may vary
depending on the person-job assignment. If person j fin-
ished the job i by efficiency eij , it is required to perform
all tasks by assigning exactly one person to each job in such
a way that the total profits of the assignment is maximized.
Furthermore, if there are m persons and n pieces of jobs, and
m ≥ n, which means some job can be done by more than one
person. The problem is changed into GAP (General Assign-
ment Problem) [22, 23]. Obviously, the two cases are single
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object and not adapt to allocation of GRS. Thus, for mak-
ing it fit to our problems, we need to reconstruct GAP and
change it into multi-object GAP. The problems are merely
divided into the following two cases [24].
Case 1 There are n pieces of resources and m jobs (m ≥ n).
It is required to perform all jobs by assigning one piece of
resource to bj (bj ≥ 1 one or more than one) job(s) in such
a way that the total profits of the assignment is maximized.




We might as well suppose that allocation should think about
p factor such as router, bandwidth, price, etc. Assume fac-
tor k (k = 1,2, . . . , p) that resource j arranged to job i
can make GRS economy efficiency eij (i = 1,2, . . . ,m; j =
1,2, . . . , n), the problem is how to allocate the assignment


















xij ∈ {0,1} (i = 1,2, . . . ,m; j = 1,2, . . . , n)
Case 2 There are n pieces of resources and m jobs (m ≤ n).
It is required to perform all jobs by assigning ai (ai ≥ 1 one
or more than one) piece of resource(s) to one job in such a
way that the total profits of the assignment is maximized.




We might as well suppose that allocation should think about


















xij ∈ {0,1} (i = 1,2, . . . ,m; j = 1,2, . . . , n)
Assume factor k (k = 1,2, . . . , p) that resource j ar-
ranged to job i can make GRS economy efficiency eij (i =
1,2, . . . ,m; j = 1,2, . . . , n), the problem is how to allocate
the assignment and make the GRS manager get the maxi-
mum profits.
7 Performance evaluation
Model 1 & Model 2 is a general model of allocation of GRS.
The solution of these two models has been finished. Accord-
ing to the procedure of multi-object GAP1& multi-object
GAP2 [23, 24], we can make a program to simulate test with
C++. We give three examples to show the feasibility of our
scheme.





4 9 6 4
3 8 5 4






3 5 4 7
5 7 8 9






0.64 0.79 0.84 0.77
0.76 0.81 0.84 0.85
0.70 0.69 0.78 0.68
⎞
⎠
as a small scale case just n = 4 and m = 3, and matrix
M_1,M_2,M_3 is such as matrix of time if each resource
would allocate each job, matrix of price if each resource
would allocate each job and matrix of efficiency if each re-





0.29 0.43 0.58 0.73
0.63 0.62 0.84 0.96
0.54 0.25 0.65 0.47
⎞
⎠




0.29 0.43 0.58 0.73 0 0
0.63 0.62 0.84 0.96 0 0
0.54 0.25 0.65 0.47 0 0
0.29 0.43 0.58 0.73 0 0
0.63 0.62 0.84 0.96 0 0






0.67 0.53 0.38 0.23 0.96 0.96
0.33 0.34 0.12 0 0.96 0.96
0.42 0.71 0.31 0.49 0.96 0.96
0.67 0.53 0.38 0.23 0.96 0.96
0.33 0.34 0.12 0.96 0.96 0.96
0.42 0.71 0.31 0.49 0.96 0.96
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Matrix R is called a compositive matrix about fuzzy rela-
tionship. We can also calculate the expand benefit matrix A.
According to the Hungary algorithm [23], we can also
calculate the matrix A.
Combining the fuzzy theory with Hungary algorithm
which is applied to solve conventional assignment problem,
the last allocation of resource is calculated as the following
matrix X.
X = (Xij )6×6 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
According to the previous four column of matrix X,
x31 = 1, x12 = 1, x23 = 1x54 = 1, it is easy to decide the
allocation of the resources. That is the first resource to the
third job, the second resource to the first job but the third
and fourth resources together to the third job. That is the
optimization of this allocation.





























as a small scale case just n = 4 and m = 3, and matrix G1,
G2,G3 is such as matrix of time if each resource would allo-
cate each job, matrix of price if each resource would allocate
each job and matrix of efficiency if each resource would al-










Combining the fuzzy theory with Hungary algorithm
which is applied to solve conventional assignment problem,





0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
According to the previous four row of matrix X, it is easy
to decide the allocation that makes the profits reach its max-
imum. The assignment is:
The second resource to the first job;
The third resource to the third job;
The first and the fourth resource are arranged to the sec-
ond job.





3 6 4 0
8 10 15 8
13 8 7 2

















Coefficient matrix C =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
14 11 13 17
9 7 2 9
4 9 10 15
15 10 5 13
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (4)
The Hungarian algorithm can mainly be described as the
follows:
This algorithm depends on two features of the assignment
problem:
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• Each resource must be assigned to one and only one job
and vice versa.
• In the coefficient matrix C, a constant can be added or
subtracted from all Cij in a row or all Cij in a column
without having any effect on the set of optimal assign-
ment. There are three steps in the Hungarian algorithm:
Step 1: Find the opportunity coefficient matrix.
Step 2: Test for an optimal assignment. If an optimal
assignment can be made, make it and stop.
Step 3: Revise the opportunity coefficient matrix and
return to step 2.
Let us apply Hungarian algorithm to Formula (4), we
can get the result of the assignment.
The assignment is
X1 → Resource R2
X2 → Resource R4
X3 → Resource R1
X4 → Resource R3
So, the solution of Formula (3) is
11 + 9 + 4 + 5 = 29,
and
6 + 8 + 13 + 12 = 39
is the result of Formula (2) either.
8 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we present a novel economy model based on
GRS, which is a new concept to organize and manage the
grid resources in VO. Moreover, we optimize the allocation
by combining the fuzzy theory with Hungarian algorithm.
At the same time, we set up a procedure and algorithm in
order to make more gross profits for the manager of GRS.
There are some differences between our approach and the
other ones which focus on grid resource consumers, not the
manager. In terms of response time and wait time, the im-
provement of efficiency is achieved by our construction of
GRS. The proposed method in this paper is an innovation
of grid resource allocation from the angle of resource man-
ager. However, the restrictive condition of the model and al-
gorithm brings disadvantage of applications. Complication
and efficiency is not evaluated enough while large numbers
of resources and consumer exist. The examples are just a
small scale situation (only n = 4). It may be very difficult
when the n is bigger. We plan to investigate approaches to
solve it in our GRS-based posted price model as future work.
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